This paper builds on past analyses of the roll call behavior of party switchers in the United States Congress (Nokken, 2000; Nokken and Poole, 2004) to investigate how party affiliation constrains members' roll call behavior. Previous studies utilized aggregate roll call indexes to conclude party switchers exhibit statistically significant shifts in their roll call behavior at the time they switch parties. Significant behavioral changes resulting from party switching, though, tend to be concentrated in periods of high ideological polarization. In this paper, I calculate DW-NOMINATE scores for switchers and non-switchers on important subsets of roll call votes: final passage, amendment, and procedural votes. I hypothesize that party switchers should exhibit the greatest changes in procedural and amendment votes, and may exhibit little or no significant behavioral changes on final passage votes. My analyses show that while most switchers make noticeable changes in votes on final passage, larger changes tend to occur on amendment and procedural votes.
Introduction -Party Defection in the United States Congress
The importance of party affiliation in the United States is a somewhat enigmatic concept.
Legislative parties in the US are rather loose confederation of individuals sharing a common party label, but lacking the discipline and uniformly high levels of party cohesion of their counterparts in parliamentary systems. Likewise, the sizable portion of independent and unaligned voters in the electorate may contribute to the relatively weak legislative parties. Given the lack of discipline and the fluid nature of party identification in the electorate, one might expect to observe frequent instances of party switching among strategic political actors to try to capture the benefits associated with membership in the party that enjoys more support among the electorate. Somewhat surprisingly, shifts in party affiliation among House and Senate members rarely occur, even during those times when the mass electorate expresses strongly negative views of the two parties. Illustrative of the rarity of such an event is the fact that only 38 Senators and 160 House members switched parties over a 163 year period (Nokken and Poole, 2004) . 1 The observed dynamic of party defection among members of the US Congress stands in marked contrast to switching in a number of other countries, the most obvious difference being the relative frequency of party switching. Party switching is rare in the US, but far more common in other countries. That differential in frequency greatly influences the focus of research on party switching across countries. The frequency with which party switching occurs outside the US allows scholars to exploit the relatively large numbers of observations and address questions of why and when legislators switch parties. The best predictive model of party 1 Nokken and Poole (2004) define a party switch to include nearly any instance of a member adopting a new party label during three stable partisan eras in the House and Senate (1793 to 1813 , 1827 to 1849 , and 1877 to 1998 . Using Martis's (1989) party codes, they utilized a program to identify all MCs whose party label changed during the course of their careers. Oppenheimer and Hatcher (2003) present an alternative list of switchers derived from the use of more restrictive definitions of party switching. defection in the US, on the other hand, is a naïve model that predicts no one switches party. 2 While the actual act of switching parties in American history is rare, the set of party defectors proves to be an analytically useful group of legislators with which to investigate how congressional party affiliation constrains member behavior.
Given that the vast majority of members retain a single party label throughout the entirety of their careers, switchers are a valuable group to utilize to evaluate how switching parties influences their behavior. A common approach to studying party switching in the American context is to utilize a quasi-experimental research design to assess the behavioral consequences of party switching. Members who switch parties comprise an experimental group of sorts that can be used to evaluate changes resulting from switching party affiliation in two ways. First, they allow one to compare the pre-and post-switch roll call behavior for individual party defectors. Second, one can compare the roll call behavior of party switchers to those members who do not change parties. The theoretical motivation for such analyses is that part affiliation is one of the primary factors that shapes or constrains the roll call behavior of MCs. Parties oftentimes provide a clear position for members within particular policy areas, thereby serving to place constraints on the positions their members can credibly take and still assert status as a loyal Democrat or Republican. If party affiliation does constrain the voting behavior of members of Congress (MCs) in a meaningful way, one would be more likely to observe significant shifts in behavior among party defectors than among those who do not change parties.
I exploit a natural experimental research design to discern how party affiliation influences roll call behavior. I use the DW-NOMINATE scaling procedure to calculate MCs' ideal points on final passage, amendment, and procedural votes from the 1953 to 2002 (83 rd to 107 th Congresses). I then utilize a technique implemented by Poole (2005) , Goodman (2004) , and 2 I acknowledge Brian Gaines for helping to identify this point. Nokken and Poole (2004) 
Studying a Rare Bird -Analyzing Party Defection in the US Congress
In the study of congressional party defection, scholars generally take one of two paths.
The first path analyzes the act of switching itself and tires to identify the factors that cause individuals to switch parties. The varying fortunes of the parties among voters may potentially induce individuals to switch parties. Aldrich and Bianco (1992) (Yoshinaka, 2005) .
Other analyses seek to explain when and why members switch parties. King and Benjamin (1986) to members of the other party and switch parties to take advantage of a better ideological fit (Castle and Fett, 1996) . Recognizing that many Southern Democrats fit that description, the Republican Party began actively recruiting Democratic office holders at all levels of government to switch affiliations and join the Republican Party (Cannon, 1992; Cannon and Sousa, 1992) The second path of inquiry focuses on party switching and its consequences for roll call voting behavior. More generally, the set of party switchers serves as a useful analytical tool with which to study the effects of party on roll call behavior, and contribute to the party versus preferences debate. Traditionally, those studying congressional behavior simply asserted that party affiliation in part played a causal role in MCs' voting behavior. By virtue of affiliating with a party, legislators could be led to support the party's stated position despite possessing policy preferences that diverge from the rest of their party. Krehbiel (1993) (Cox and McCubbins, 1993) , I compared the pre-and post-switch behavior of defectors to determine whether they changed their voting behavior and, if so, whether the change was gradual over time or transpired at the time of the party switch.
Next, I compared the voting behavior of switcher to a control group comprised of members who compiled similar roll call records as switchers but who maintained their party affiliation I label proximates.
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I found that party switchers made dramatic shifts in their voting behavior at the time the switched parties, and that the direction of the shift was consistent with expectation (to the right for those joining the GOP, to the left for those becoming Democrats). Furthermore, such shifts were limited to the party defectors, with proximates showing no evidence of statistically significant changes. Such changes in roll call behavior among party switchers suggest that party affiliation carries with it a code of conduct. Deviating from the party's stated course may result in recalcitrant members being sanctioned by the party leadership (Cox and McCubbins, 1993) or being punished by the party's faithful in the electorate, especially in primary elections (Brady and Schwartz, 1990; Grose and Yoshinaka, 2003; and Grose 2004) .
Party switching does not, however, always lead to noticeable changes in roll call behavior. To determine how individual level behavior covaries with changes in party affiliation, Nokken and Poole (2004) treated party switchers as two separate members, and calculated preand post-switch DW-NOMINATE scores. 4 They found that instances of significant behavioral shifts were concentrated in eras marked by high levels of ideological polarization. Oppenheimer and Hatcher (2003) also analyzed the roll call behavior of switchers over a long span of time, and arrived at similar conclusions. They also conducted interviews with a number of the switchers serving in Congress. When asked about the behavioral consequences of their party defection, a number of party switchers asserted that they made no significant changes to their roll call voting behavior, but that any observed shifts were likely the result of changing votes on procedural matters.
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Both conclusions are highly plausible implications of party switching. First, during polarized periods, switchers have no real options but to make dramatic changes in voting 4 DW-NOMINATE scores are generated from individual's roll call behavior using a multidimensional scaling procedure. The scores range from -1, the most liberal value, to +1, the most conservative. In those instances where a member switched parties during a legislative session, we split the member's roll call record at the time the party switch was announced, essentially treating them as a new member of Congress upon changing parties.
5 Procedural votes are especially important in the House of Representatives. A number of procedural hurdles must be cleared before a bill reaches the floor in the House. Most notably, the House must agree on the rule issued from the Rules Committee that lays out the parameters of debate such time for debate and the number and types of amendments that will be in order, for instance. In light of the importance of such procedural issues, my analysis will focus on the House. See, for instance, Rohde (1991) and Cox and McCubbins (1993; . Republican Party label. 6 In a similar vein, MCs may go to great lengths to construct an ideological reputation among constituents (Dougan and Munger, 1989) fearing that deviation from that well-defined vote history (Asher and Weisberg, 1978) and increase the likelihood of electoral defeat (Lott and Bronars, 1993) . As a consequence, those members could choose to maintain a consistent voting record on final passage votes regardless of party affiliation since it is most likely constituents observe their decisions on final passage votes in particular and explaining obvious flip-flops on certain policies could lead to electoral difficulties for the member.
While final passage behavior may remain relatively stable for party switchers, especially during periods of intraparty heterogeneity, roll call behavior on the other categories of votes may change dramatically, consistent with the findings from Oppenheimer and Hatcher's (2003) interviews. To constituents, the party switchers continue to compile a consistent record on substantive policy proposals, the set of votes most salient to the electorate. It is less likely constituents take notice or care about members' votes on procedural matters, even though such votes ultimately have significant policy consequences. While constituents may fail to notice changes on procedural votes, a switcher's colleagues certainly will take note of such votes. Cox and McCubbins (2005) show that majority party leaders are highly successful at keeping the party cartel intact on crucial procedural votes, including those members who oppose the legislation on final passage. Switchers of all stripes, then, should be expected to exhibit significant behavioral shifts moving them toward their new party on procedural matters. One might conclude the party switchers enjoy the best of both worlds: they can please their new party colleagues with shifts on the more electorally innocuous procedural votes, while pleasing their constituents by maintaining a consistent voting record on final passage policy votes.
Party Effects and Party Switchers
Switchers' claims that changes in their voting behavior resulted from changes in procedural votes generates a series of questions about the nature of party influence on roll call behavior that lend themselves to empirical testing. The first and most obvious hypothesis is that members exhibit higher levels of party loyalty on procedural votes than on final passage votes.
That suggests that switchers will make a dramatic move across the ideological spectrum on procedural votes at the time they switch parties. My analyses will allow me to determine whether switchers modified their roll call behavior when they switched, and whether changes are limited to MCs who switch parties. The second hypothesis posits that switchers' votes on final passage may be less likely to exhibit significant changes. If party affiliation is a key determinant of voting on procedural matters, it is plausible that ideology is a key determinant of policy votes.
Party switching might carry with it policy-based behavior changes to reflect the switcher's new party label, but one might expect smaller changes than on procedural votes. In particular, dramatic changes in policy-based final passage votes would correlate highly with levels of intraparty homogeneity and with interparty heterogeneity -or "the condition" in conditional party government (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 2001 
Measuring the Effects of Party Switching
To determine the consequences of party switching on roll call voting, I utilized a procedure developed by Poole to evaluate how the magnitude of a switcher's change in voting behavior to a set of common members serving in the same Congresses to determine if the switcher exhibited larger variance in his DW-NOMINATE score than the non-switchers. I do not offer details on the scaling procedure in this paper, but point interested readers to Goodman (2004), Nokken and Poole (2004) , and Poole (2005) for a detailed discussion of the scaling methodology.
10 Decisions on which vote types to include in the respective categories essentially mirrors the coding strategy of Crespin , Rohde, and Vander Wielen (2002) .
11 The mean number of final passage votes was just over 308, with a low of 73 and maximum of 629 votes. For amendment votes, the mean was just greater than 243 votes, with a low of 10 and a maximum of 590. The procedural vote mean was just greater than 138, and ranged from a minimum of 39 votes to a maximum of 259.
12 Generating ideal point estimates with such a small number of votes may well produce scores with large standard errors, and questionable precision. (Personal communication with Keith Poole). 14 The data from Table 1 are useful for illustrating that party defection appears to generate significant behavioral changes at the time a member crosses the aisle, as previous research has shown (Nokken, 2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2001; Nokken and Poole, 2004) . What Table 1 fails to illuminate, though, is whether these changes can be considered significant.
Granted many of the shifts are of such magnitude it is hard to imagine them not being significant. Table 2 provides information regarding the direction and significance of any shifts in the voting behavior of party switchers (Nokken and Poole, 2004) . First, they identify those members who make a shift in the expected direction (signified with a +). Those names that appear in bold type 13 The data are available at: http://www.voteview.com/dwnomin.htm, file HL01108A1_PRES.DAT.
14 Characterizing Goode's switch as a simple move from the Democratic to Republican Parties without considering his service as an Independent is not an outlandish assumption given that he caucused with and received his committee assignments from the Republicans while serving as an Independent.
are listed as exhibiting significant behavioral changes. To identify statistically significant shifts, Nokken and Poole (2004) calculated the change in a switcher's pre-and post-switch first dimension DW-NOMINATE score. Next, they compared the magnitude of the switcher's shift to the changes for all MCs in the corresponding Congresses (the N in Table 2 While a large proportion of the MCs included in this analysis exhibit significant behavioral changes along the first dimension when scaling all roll calls, not all members do.
Additionally, some of the MCs who have a label of "Independent" attached to them (whether as a modifier for a party or as a party ID), and do not necessarily fit the expected pattern. My proposal to replicate Nokken and Poole's work will offer some additional insight to the nature of behavioral changes among those members. It will also help determine the "sources" of the significance in the changes exhibited by the other MCs. That is, it will allow us to discern whether MCs move across the aisle to adopt a new set of positions on both matters of procedure as well as matters of substantive policy. Identifying whether significant behavioral shifts take place across all roll call votes, or are concentrated among specific subsets of votes will help clarify the role party affiliation plays both in the legislative as well as in the electoral arena.
Policy or Procedure? Source of Behavioral Change Among Party Switchers
The conventional wisdom regarding the consequences of party defection in the recent past is that switchers make dramatic changes to their roll call behavior coincident with the change in party labels. What has yet to be addressed, though, is whether members make a wholesale change among all categories of votes or whether the changes are concentrated among a few types of roll calls. I present data that gets at this question by analyzing the pre-and post- The results for votes on final passage are listed in Table 3 , for amendment votes in Table   4 , and for procedural votes in Table 5 . The first comparison I make across the three tables simply tabulates the number of major party switchers who move in the "correct" direction for In most instances, I find that the major party switchers exhibit changes to their voting records consistent with expectations. To determine whether such changes in roll call behavior are common among all members or tend to be concentrated among the switchers, I next turn to evaluating the magnitude of changes, the percentile score for the switchers. The expectation is that the largest changes take place on procedural and amendment votes. The first step in this process is to tabulate the number of switchers whose change in roll call behavior places them below the 50 th percentile in terms of size of shift (that is, a majority of non-switching members exhibited larger changes in roll call behavior across the two Congresses than the switcher Finding greater higher percentile ranks on amendment and procedural votes than on final passage votes would be consistent with a party as procedural coalition story. Indeed, the percentile ranks on final passage votes exceeds the change in amendment and procedural votes in six instances.
In four cases, members' values were identical across categories. In fifteen instances, a members' percentile ranks on amendment and procedural scores exceeded that value for final passage votes. This result may well suggest that the important changes in roll call behavior associated with party defection take place on procedural and amendment votes. While not definitive evidence that parties are driving the changes in members behavior on the less visible but highly important amendment and procedural votes, but it certainly is consistent with the expectations of a party as procedural coalition perspective.
Discussion and Conclusion
A somewhat ironic aspect of quantitative studies of party switchers in the American context is that they focus squarely on the outliers in the data set. Investigating these seemingly anomalous individuals on their own is an interesting and worthwhile endeavor, it does not necessarily shed light on matters of more general theoretical importance. My primary purpose has been to explain why this small set of members of Congress is of theoretical interest to scholars of legislative politics. I argue that despite the "small n" problem, party switchers allow students of American politics to understand more fully how party labels and partisan structures within the legislative arena shape (or fail to shape) the behavior of individual members of Congress. Lacking individual-level variation on party affiliation makes it difficult to ascertain just how membership in a party may influence an individual. Even though switches are rare, I
argue they are important events that offer insight into much broader topics in politics than simply detailing why Billy Tauzin left the Democratic Party to become a Republican in the 104 th Congress.
In this paper, I extend my previous studies of the roll call behavior of party switchers to gain a better grasp on how of their roll call behavior changes when they change parties. Previous studies provided persuasive evidence that party switchers, especially those of more recent vintage, made significant changes to their roll call behavior upon joining a new party. Given the tendency for individual MCs to stake out ideological turf and strive to maintain a consistent voting record, such dramatic changes are somewhat surprising. The primary question I sought to answer was whether party switchers made noticeable changes in their roll call behavior across the board. That is, were they as likely to exhibit changes in their voting behavior on substantive policy votes as on more innocuous votes on procedural matters? By disaggregating roll call votes into specific categories, I take a first step toward answering that question. While the switchers studied here exhibited sizable shifts in their voting behavior across all types of votes, I
did find that the changes exhibited on amendment and procedural votes tended to be greater than the changes shown on final passage votes.
These results, though limited to a small subgroup of MCs, shed some light on some important topics that extend beyond just party switching. Legislative scholarshave turned their attention to the construction of congressional agendas and the central role rules and procedures play in that process in an effort to understand the importance of partisan institutions. Party coalitions seek to gain a majority in the House in large part to allow them to create and implement rules and procedures. The parties fight bitterly to do so because they realize that by controlling procedure gives them an upper hand in winning on substantive policy matters. What they need to accomplish this feat, though, is a coherent majority on procedural matters. Scholars have noted the increasingly cohesive parties on procedural matters and illustrated how that cohesion can be translated into partisan victories on policy matters (Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 2005 Table 4 House Party Defectors' Change in Amendment Vote DWNOMINATE Scores, 1953 -2002 
